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The phrase "Real Evidence" has not attracted much discussion
from text-writers, nor can it be said -to have obtained a very firm
foothold in our legal nomenclature. Introduced by Bentham in one
of his numerous classifications, Best adopts it without examination;
Greenleaf, Taylor, Wharton and Stephen ignore it; Thayer accords
it but the barest notice; Wigmore criticises it only to discard; and
Chamberlayne, who subjects it to a lengthened analysis, dismisses it
as, for the most part, profitless. Indeed had it not been for the out-
standing importance claimed, for it by the late Mr. Gulson in his
able and suggestive Philosophy of Proof,' it might perhaps have
dropped out of forensic currency altogether. Whether, in spite of
such newly acquired prestige, that fate should not still be reserved
for it seems to be a point worthy of consideration.
What is "real" evidence? It is a term which is applied mainly
to classification and raises few, if any questions of admissibility.
Unfortunately, however, it has been the subject of several conflicting
definitions, none of which can be said to be wholly satisfactory or
generally accepted. Three significations have been assigned to it,
and these we propose to examine in detail.
Evidence from things as distinct from persons. Bentham, who is
responsible for most of our evidentiary divisions, begins by describing
evidence in general, natural evidence. He says:
"The Evidence by which in any mind persuasion is capable of
being produced is derived from two sources: from the operation of
the perceptive or intellectual faculties of the individual himself, and
from the supposed operation of the like faculties on the part of
others."
2
1 Gulson, The Philosophy of Proof (9o5).
i Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827) 51-52.
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The former he calls evidence ab intra, the latter evidence ab extra.
He then treats of the several classes into which judicial evidence may
be divided, the first of these being "Personal and Real."
"Personal evidence is that afforded by some human being, either
voluntarily by discourse or signs (testimonial is the term by which
evidence of this description will henceforth be designated), or involun-
tarily by changes of deportment or countenance. Real evidence is
that afforded by a being belonging, not to the class of persons, but to
that of things. . . By real evidence I understand all evidence of
which any object belonging to the class of things is the source, persons
being included in respect of such properties as belong to them in
common with things."$
He adds that "physical real evidence," whether arising from a real
or personal source, is either immediate, i. e., where the thing which is
the source of the evidence is present to the senses of the judge; or
reported, i. e., where its state is testified to -by a percipient witness,
in which case it is "immediate" to the witness, but "reported" to the
judge.4
One or two questions arise on these definitions. What does Bentham
mean to include in real and personal evidence respectively? No diffi-
culty arises with regard to that portion of real evidence which he
describes as arising from a "real" source, i. e., from purely inanimate
objects; but considerable difficulty arises, and conflicting views pre-
vail, when he speaks of real evidence arising from a "personal
source." What precisely does he mean by this, and wherein does
"real evidence from a personal source" differ from "personal evi-
dence" as he has aqbove described it? We think that he here refers
solely to "those properties of persons which belong to them in
common with things"; and that Best 5 and Gulson6 are wrong in
assuming that Bentham intends to include in this class the voluntary
conduct of persons. It is certainly curious that he should give no
direct indication of his views on this point; but his various references
thereto seem to leave little doubt of his meaning. Thus,
"Persons being composed of matter as well as spirit, having their
physical as well as their psychological properties, belong in virtue of
their physical properties to the class of things. Hence real evidence
may flow alike from a personal as well as a real source, personal
evidence cannot flow from any but a personal source."
7
"Any sort of circumstantial evidence which though it have for its
source a person, serves not to convey an indication of his mind may,
with more propriety, be ranked under the head of real than of personal
evidence, as, for example, the appearance produced on the body of a
man already dead or still alive by a wound." s
'Ibid.; 3 ibid., 26; Dumont, Treatise on Judicial Evidence (1825) 19.
'3 Bentham, op. cit., 33-34-
5 1 Best, Law of Evidence (ist Am. fr. 5th London, 1875) secs. 196-197.
'Gulson, op. cit., secs. 223-225. 73 Bentham, op. cit., xi, note.
3 1 ibid., 69, note; 3 ibid., ii, note.
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"Circumstances comprehend the state of things and the conduct of
persons. Things furnish what is called 'real' evidence; but whether
we argue from things, or from the conduct of persons, this species
(circumstantial evidence) is always founded on the connection
between cause and effect."9
And in developing the topic of circumstantial evidence, these two
main divisions, real evidence and the conduct of persons, each treated
in great detail, are kept entirely distinct. Confining his illustrations,
for reasons of convenience, to criminal cases, he includes under the
former head, the following items: (i) Subject-matter of the offense
(the person killed or hurt-the thing damaged or destroyed-the
document or coin fabricated) ; (2) the fruits of the crime (the goods
stolen-the money or profit obtained); (3) instruments used in
committing the crime; (4) materials designed to assist in its per-
petration; (5) place of deposit of the object of the crime; (6)
neighboring bodies suffering change in consequence of the crime
(places spotted with blood). These matters, he remarks, may indi-
cate the crime either with, or without, indicating its author.10 Under
"The conduct of persons," on the other hand, he includes prepara-
tions, attempts, declarations of intention, threats, silence or confes-
sions of the accused, concealment or suppression of evidence, flight,
motives and character.11  It may be added that the heading "Real
Evidence" is pre-fixed to each of the four chapters above quoted,
but is not prefixed to, or used in connection with, any of the six
subsequent chapters.23 On the whole, therefore, it seems reasonably
certain that, under "physical real evidence, whether arising from
a real or personal source," Bentham does not intend to class the
voluntary conduct of individuals.
This being so, we .should naturally expect him to class it as "per-
sonal" evidence, under which head it seems obviously and properly
to belong. Oddly enough, however, in his various definitions of
personal evidence, he makes no mention whatever of the voluntary
conduct of persons, but speaks only of their utterances or demeanor.
Thus (I) in his main definition, already quoted, he designates per-
sonal evidence as "that afforded by a human being, either voluntarily
by discourse or signs, or involuntarily by changes of demeanour or
countenance"; (2) "Personal evidence is that furnished by a human
being and is generally called testimony; real evidence is that deduced
from the state of things. A deposes that he saw B pursue C with
threats. C is found killed and B's bloody knife is found near by.
A's testimony is personal evidence; the knife is real evidence. 'Real'
technically signifies merely thing";14 (3) "Division taken from the
will of the witness deposing: personal voluntary and personal invol-
"Dumont, op. cit., x43. 10i Bentham, op. cit., chs. 3-6.
' Ibid., chs. 7-12. "Chs. 3-6, supra.
'Chs. 7-z2, supra. "'Dumont, op. cit., 12.
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untary. Personal voluntary evidence is that furnished, on the request
of the judge, or even before any request, without menace or coercion.
Personal involuntary evidence is that extorted by rigor or restraint,
or given, not by an act of the will, but in defiance of the will, as the
effect of the emotions, displaying itself in the behaviour, gesture, or
physiognomy of the witness. These signs are of the nature of cir-
cumstantial evidence."15 "Evidence derived from discourse is direct
evidence, that derived from deportment is circumstantial."-, In all
this, it will be noticed, Bentham seems almost pointedly to avoid
including voluntary conduct in "personal" evidence.
But if he excludes it from "real" and does not include it in "per-
sonal," where else does it come in? If under neither head, then his
division, "real and personal" would not be a complete division
embracing, all evidence, but only a partial one embracing some. Is,
this what he means? We think not, since he states emphatically that,
"considered in respect of its source, all evidence flows either from
persons or things; all evidentiary facts as well as all- principal facts,
are afforded either by persons or things.'17 We are therefore driven
to conclude that he does, after all, intend to class voluntary conduct
as personal evidence, although he nowhere says so in terms, and we
base this view on the grounds (i) that he expressly limits "real
evidence arising from a personal source" to "those properties of
persons belonging to them in common with things," i. e., to such
evidence as, "though it has for its source a person, serves not to
convey an indication of his mind"; (2) that in his detailed illustra-
tions of "real evidence" he does not cite a single instance of volun-
tary acts or conduct; and (3) that, in explaining the nature of
cir umstantial evidence, he states it may consist "either of some
physical fact from a real source, or a psychological fact from a per-
sonal source, such psychological fact having necessarily for its index,
some physical fact issuing from the same personal source," adding
that "all psychological evidence cannot come under any other
denomination than that of personal evidence.""' Considering, how-
ever, that the voluntary conduct of persons constitutes by far the
most important part of judicial evidence, and that he had already
fully elaborated it elsewhere, it is strange that he should here lay all
the stress on the testimonial side of personal evidence and none on the
circumstantial. One result of this is that text-writers have uniformly,
but quite excusably, misread his meaning.
Bentham, as we have seen, divides "real" evidence into immediate
and reported, but he makes no similar division of "personal" evi-
dence. There seems no reason for this difference. Suppose, in a
criminal trial, a witness gives damaging evidence against the accused
I Ibid., x3. xi Benthami op. cit., 52-54, 69.
23 ibid., ix, note. 8Ibid.
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who thereupon changes countenance. Here, under Bentham's defini-
tion, there would be two examples of "personal" evidence, one
voluntary and one involuntary, and both would also be "immediate."
Suppose, however, that the same statement were made and change
of countenance occurred out of court, and were afterwards proved
in court by a percipient witness. This would be "personal," but
"reported" evidence.
Bentham states that "real" evidence is always circumstantial.'9
But this is not so. When an item of "real" evidence is one from
which the principal fact may be inferred, the evidence is, no doubt,
circumstantial. But when its own existence, or some visible quality
of it, is itself the principal fact, the evidence seems dearly direct.20
Best's conception of real evidence, while in the main following
that of Bentham, appears to differ in three respects: (i) He classes
involuntary changes of deportment or countenance as real and not
as personal evidence; (2) although accepting Bentham's definition
of real evidence as "that of which any object belonging to the class
of things is the source," he yet incongruously includes thereunder
the voluntary conduct of persons, for "where an offence or contempt
is committed in presence of a tribunal it has direct real evidence of
the fact" ;21 and (3) he recognizes a direct as well as a circumstantial
class of such evidence. 22
The views of the above writers have been sharply criticised both
by Gulson and Chamberlayne. Gulson formulates two main charges.
The first is that the division of evidence into real and personal affords
"a striking illustration of the confusion engendered by the failure to
distinguish between the quid probandum and the modus probandi;
between the fact the subject-matter of proof and the means of ascer-
taining it, or Evidence. . . For it is not the quality of the fact
which is the subject of proof, that must determine how evidence
should be classed, but the nature of the means employed to prove it."2 3
The basis of this criticism, it will be seen, is the distinction its author
draws between facts and evidence, a distinction he elsewhere describes
as of the most vital importance 24 and which he makes one of the
cardinal features of his book. It is a little curious perhaps, that he
does not, as he might, cite in support of this distinction the authority
of Sir J. Stephen who, thirty years earlier, had framed his Digest
upon practically the same division, viz., relevancy (facts), and proof
(evidence, oral and documentary), and who equally complained that
"the neglect of the distinction has thrown the whole subject into
confusion and made what is really plain appear almost incompre-
" ibid., 55; 3 ibid., 33-34.
"Best, op. cit.,"sec. I96; Gulson, op. cit., secs. 227-228.
"Best, orp. cit., sec. 196. "Ibid.
* Gulson, op. cit., sees. 223, 225. "Ibid., sec. 12.
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hensible.' '2 5 In the case of Stephen, however, a comparison of the
various definitions and articles in the Digest will show that it is quite
impossible to maintain this distinction; and Gulson is confronted with
much the same difficulty. Thus he is forced to admit that the dis-
tinction between facts and evidence is a purely arbitrary one, and also
that any fact which generates proof "is in some sense a means of
proof."2 6 But he does not seem to realize that while he excludes
facts-because they are the subject of evidence, he yet admits testimony
although it is the subject-matter of .per.ception. On his own showing,
therefore, one element may be the subject-matter of another without
forfeiting its title to be classed as "evidence." Here, also, then, the
subject-matter test breaks down. It seems, indeed, that it is not
Bentham and Best who err in failing to distinguish the quid pro-
bandum from the modus probandi, but Gulson himself who fails fully
to recognize that a quid probandum, when established, may itself
become a modus probandi. His second criticism amounts to this:
that the "reported real evidence" of Bentham and Best is practically
indistinguishable from their "personal" evidence, and so should be
eliminated; and that the remaining heads "immediate real" and
"personal" are already covered by their own previous but more scien-
tific ab intra and ab extra, which latter classification he thinks should,
as the only valid one, be adopted.2 7 The arguments are too long to
quote; but no doubt Best, by enlarging his "real" evidence to cover
practically everything but testimony does, when he adds "reported,"
tend to assimilate it to his personal, or ab extra, class. Bentham,
however, makes it clear that in speaking of "real reported" evidence
he, at least, is treating of one strictly limited species (i. e., objects
belonging to the class of things) as forming the subject-matter of,
and being brought before the court by, another and quite distinct
species (i. e., personal evidence, or at least that portion of it which
he calls testimonial), and in so doing he cannot be said to identify
or confuse the two classes. Indeed he seems to have anticipated this
very objection by explaining that "immediate real evidence is a case
of purely real, purely circumstantial evidence," while
"reported real evidence is a compound of real evidence exhibited
through the medium of personal, of circumstantial exhibited through
the medium of direct. To "the reporting witness, it was so much
immediate, so much pure real evidence; but to the judge it is but
reported real evidence. "28
Bentham's "real immediate" evidence, therefore, embraces something
less than his ab intra class, and his "personal" evidence something
more than-his db extra class.
' Stephen, Digest of the Law of ER)idence (1876) xii.
'Gulson, op. cit., secs. 203, 26o.
' Ibid., secs. 223-226. 1i Bentham, op. cit., 34.
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Turning now to Chamberlayne's criticisms, these unfortunately
are somewhat marred by his occasional misreading of the above
authors. Thus, he attributes to Best, instead of to Bentham, the
paternity of the division of real evidence into "immediate" and
"reported," and this initial mistake generates other subsidiary errors.
"This (Best's) classification of real and personal evidence obviously
announces several propositions in excess of that stated by Bentham.
Among these are: (i) Real evidence may be either immediate or
reported. (2) The involuntary action of a witness is not personal
but real evidence. These additional propositions seem entirely incon-
sistent with Bentham's original definition . . . and much confusion
has necessarily resulted. . . . Best's definition of the classification
of real and personal evidence seems to be quite as seriously mistaken
in adding Bentham's definition of the ab intra, and ab extra to his
definition of real and personal evidence as he has been in adding
Bentham's distinction between voluntary and involuntary . ..
There is no limitation in Bentham's view, in dealing with evidence
which is directly perceived by the court, that it should be or be thereby
created real evidence. It is apparently Best's conception that this
classification of real evidence as a term coextensive with whatever
the court perceives for itself is in accordance with Bentham's
definition.1"29
But Best does not add the division immediate and reported to "real
and personal evidence," he confines it, as does Bentham, to "real
evidence" alone; nor does he conceive, or suppose Bentham to con-
ceive, that real evidence and evidence by perception are coextensive,
since, having just copied Bentham in showing that real evidence is
sometimes not immediate but reported, he could hardly think, or
attribute to Bentham the thought, that they were coextensive. Best's
mistake, therefore, does not lie here; it lies rather in supposing, as
he appears to, that his own wide conception of real evidence and
Bentham's much narrower one, are identical. In summarizing the
views of Gulson, Chamberlayne seems, again, to be not quite a reliable
guide. Thus, he remarks that "the view expressed by Best as to the
proper meaning of the term "real evidence" has been endorsed by
the opinion of Mr. Gulson" ;3o and in support of this quotes the case
of an offense committed in the presence of a tribunal, which is cited
by Best and approved by Gulson as an instance of real evidence.
But he omits to notice the reason of this approval. Gulson asks, Why
is it real?
"Not certainly because 'any object belonging to the class of things
is the ,source of the evidence,' for here the fact in question is the act
of a person-the voluntary act of an inanimate being, involving, as
we have seen, a psychological fact; but the evidence is real because
" i Chamberlayne, Modern Evidence (191I) sec. 28.
"Ibid., sec. 29.
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the fact or act is itself manifested to the perceptive faculties of the
tribunal."'"
Again, in quoting Stephen's example of a judge looking out of the
window to see if it rains, Chamberlayne remarks that "Mr. Gulson,
following Bentham and Best, speaks of this as real evidence.1
3 2 But
why? He calls it real merely because it is "immediate," whereas
Bentham and Best would have called it real because its source was
"a thing." He does not in either case, therefore, adopt or follow
these writers. Nor is it, as Chamberlayne alleges, "suggested by
Best and endorsed by Mr. Gulson"83 that evidence -by perception is
limited to the scope of real evidence. Gulson, indeed, maintains this
view, but he does so in direct opposition to Best. In conclusion,
Chamberlayne is of opinion that the terms "real" and "personal,"
if retained at all, are only defensible when employed from the stand-
point of the court, and not from that of the witness:
"That which the tribunal perceives of an evidentiary nature fur-
nished by a thing, a physical object, is real evidence; that which it
perceives of an evidentiary nature furnished by a person, is personal
evidence. . . . If this mental concept of the viewpoint of the
tribunal be abandoned, the distinction has no value, and only confusion
results from its use.'
Material objects produced for the inspection of the Court. This is
the second and most widely accepted meaning of "real evidence."
It is obviously derived from Bentham for, though it eliminates his
"real reported" evidence, it is precisely equivalent to his "real imme-
diate" class. 'aylor does not use the term "real" at all; but under
the heading of "Evidence addressed to the senses," he treats of the
same subject and from the standpoint of the present definition, con-
fining it to the physical appearance or condition of material objects
(persons, places, or things) produced to or viewed by the tribunal.8 5
Wharton also avoids the word, dealing however under the head of
"Inspection" with the same items as Taylor, and from the same point
of view. On the other hand, Stephen omits not only the term, but
the whole topic of "real" evidence, both from the Indian Evidence
Act and the Digest, and has been a good deal criticised in consequence.
Thayer remarks:
"Stephen's limitation of the term 'evidence' to (i) statements of
witnesses and (2) documents is too narrow. When, in a controversy
between a tailor and his customer, involving the fit of a coat, the
customer puts on the coat and wears it during the trial . . . it seems
impossible to deny to this the name of 'evidence.' It is what Bentham
called 'real evidence,' a phrase which imports a very valuable dis-
U Gulson, op. cit., sec. 224. " -Chamberlayne, op. cit., sec. 30.
U Ibid., sec. 31. "Ibid.
'Taylor, Evidence (8th ed. 1875) secs. 544-566.
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crimination, when limited to that which is presented directly to the
senses of the tribunal. It is not, practically, of much importance when
divided further into 'reported real evidence.' ,,36
Thayer, therefore, so far as can be gathered, lends the weight of his
authority to the present signification. Chamberlayne follows suit.
After remarking that "it is one of the few fundamental errors of
Stephen's classification that it entirely omits perception as a medium
of evidence," and making various conjectures as to the reason of the
omission, he adopts in effect the present definition: "That which the
tribunal perceives of an evidentiary nature furnished by a thing, a
physical object, is real evidence." It is curious that Stephen's own
explanation of this matter should have been overlooked by all his
critics. It is this: that.although, in addition to oral and documentary
evidence, a third class might be formed of things produced in court,
not being documents, yet this division would introduce needless
intricacy, since as the condition of material things is usually proved
by oral evidence, there is no need to distinguish between oral and
material evidence.37 This explanation, though not perhaps very con-
vincing, shows at least that the omission was designed and not inad-
vertent. After a brief examination of the phrase "real evidence,"
Wigmore likewise comes out as a supporter of the present connotation.
"The term 'real evidence' has sometimes been applied to this
source of belief; but not happily; first, because 'real' is an ambiguous
term, and not sufficiently suggestive for the purpose; secondly, because
the process is not the employment of 'evidence' at all, in the strict
sense; and, thirdly, because the inventor of the term (Bentham,
Judicial Evidence, III, 26 ff.) used the phrase in a sense different from
that above and different from that commonly now attached to it; he
meant by it any fact about a material or corporal object, e. g. a book
or a human foot, whether produced in court or not; it is only by later
writers that the production in court is made the essential feature. '1s
Discarding the term real evidence, then, and substituting "Autoptic
Proference,"--a fact being evidenced autoptically when it is offered
for direct perception by the senses of the tribunal, without depending
on any conscious inference from some testimonial or circumstantial
fact (it is autopsy by the court, but autoptic proference by the party),-
he remarks:
"With reference to this mode of producing persuasion no question
of relevancy arises. Res ipsa loquitur. The thing proves or disproves
itself. No logical process is employed; only an act of sensible appre-
hension. . . . Bringing a knife into Court is in strictness not giv-
'Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) 263, note; see ibid.
280-281, note; and Thayer, Cases on Evidence (2d ed. 1goo) 720.
"Indian Evidence Act, 1872, introduction, 14.
as2 Wigmore, Evidence (1904) sec. I15O, note.
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ing evidence of the knife's existence. It is a mode of enabling the
Court to reach a- conviction of the existence of the knife, and is in
that sense a means of producing persuasion, yet it is not giving evi-
dence in the sense that it is asking the Court to perform a process of
inference. . . . It is thus evidence, in the sense that evidence
includes all modes, other than argument, by which a party may lay
before the tribunal that which will produce persuasion.' ' a
"It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to ask whether this is not,
after all, merely a third source of inference (additional to testimony
and circumstantial evidence), i. e., an inference from the impressions
or perceptions of the tribunal to the objective existence of the thing
perceived. The law does not need and does not attempt to consider
theories of metaphysics . . . for the purposes of judicial investi-
gation, a thing perceived by the tribunal as existing does exist."
40
Perception by the Court as distinct from the facts perceived. The
third main signification of "real evidence" is that furnished by
Gulson. As the previous definition was arrived at by eliminating
Bentham's "real reported" class and retaining his "real immediate,"
so Gulson's conception appears to have been arrived at by eliminating
from Bentham's "real immediate" evidence the factor "real," and
adopting the residue "immediate." Before quoting his definitions,
however, it will be well to see what he understands by the wider term
evidence itself, for it is one of the blemishes of his very able work
that it gives no single, unvarying, or at least reasonably stable, account
of that basic word. But at least he tells us what is not evidence,
and. so to some extent clears the ground; facts are not evidence, but -
only its subject-matter. 41 On the other hand, he describes "evidence"
sometimes as the process of ascertaining facts,
42 sometimes as proof,43
sometimes as the means of proof, by which he refers exclusively to
observation, perception, or the exercise of the senses, 44 and sometimes
as the result obtained by applying these means of proof to the fact
to be ascertained. 45 It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the
uncertainty which characterizes his conception of the wider term,
should also attach to the narrower; and here equally he seems to
vacillate between two views: (i) that real evidence consists of the
mere act of perception, as distinct from the fact perceived; and (2)
that it consists of something independent of both, viz., the result
(knowledge, persuasion, proof) obtained by applying perception to
facts. As instances of the former, he speaks of real evidence as
"The perception or immediate evidence by which the evidentiary fact
is made manifest" ;46 "'the evidence of immediate perception exercised
by the inquirer upon the thing . . . its'elf" ;47 "inspection by the
'Ibid., seci. 24 and I1i5O. Ibid., sec. ii5o.
" Gulson, op. cit., secs. 26, 26o-268.
'Ibid., secs. 17, 24. "*Ibid., secs. 24-26.
"Ibid., secs. 24-26, I68-i69, 177, 183, 223-224, 254, 259-260.
'Ibid., secs. 174, 226, 230, 266, 314, 319. 'Ibid., sec. 183.
'Ibid., sec. 224.
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tribunal of the contents of a writing is just as much real evidence of
those contents . 4  As instances of the latter, he states that "Real
evidence is the evidence obtained by the court through the mere
exercise of its own perceptive faculties" ;49 "the proof acquired by
the tribunal through the use of its own faculties of perception";sO
"the evidence furnished by the perceptive faculties of the tribunal
applied to the fact itself."5' 1
Notwithstanding these discrepancies, however, it is clear that Gulson
bases his conception of real evidence on Bentham's ab intra, or imme-
diate evidence, and not on the latter's "evidence furnished by things."
"It is much to be regretted that Bentham, having, in the difference
between evidence ab intra and evidence ab extra, struck the very
keynote, as it were, of Evidence, should, instead of adhering to and
following out that scientific division of proof, have. abandoned it
immediately in favour of the present fallacious distinction (between
real and personal evidence). For this distorted view of real evidence,
as the evidence of things, is the first false step, which has inaugurated
a long train of errors in the theory of proof." 52
Now, whether Bentham's view be correct or not, Gulson's is, we
submit, fundamentally wrong, and for this reason: it is that which
is adduced by the parties, not that which is furnished by the court in
the way of sight, hearing, or reasoning faculty, which the law regards
as evidence and for whose wrongful admission or rejection it provides
a remedy. It is the thing produced, therefore, and not its inspection
by the court, on the inference derived from its inspection, which
constitutes real evidence. Indeed we cannot help thinking that Gul-
son himself must to some extent have realized this, otherwise it is
difficult to account for his occasional lapses into what is, in effect,
the conventional view. Thus in contending th~at Best is wrong fit
classing real evidence amongst the "Instruments" of evidence, since
being immediate there is no medium or instrument involved, he
remarks: "Still, it is obvious that the physical manifestation of facts
must be classed as a means of proof distinct from Oral evidence." 5
So, in denying Bentham's distinction between written and real evi-
dence as illustrated by written names and mere marks on timber,
he states
"Not only does the manifestation of the such marks, as he describes,
to the senses of a judicial tribunal afford real evidence of the marks;
but equally does the manifestation of written characters traced upon
paper, or the production in court of paper displaying such characters,
furnish real evidence of the writing." 54
"Ibid., see. 314. 'Ibid.. secs. 226, 266.
'Ibid., sec. 314. "Ibid., sec. 319.
"Ibid., sec. 227. 'Ibid., sec. 263.
"Ibid., sec. 316.
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And a little later, with regard to a model. he remarks: "Its own
production affords real evidence (of its features) ." 55  This is, of
course, precisely what we contend; but it obviously conflicts with
his two previous definitions which more accurately represent his
distinctive view.
Gulson's treatment of this topic is, however, open to another objec-
tion. Though accepting Bentham's division ab intra and ab extra as
scientifically sound, he is still not content to adopt Bentham's later
equivalents for these terms, viz., Immediate and Reported. but prefers
to substitute for them Real and Oral. His reason for adopting "real"
is that it "may be a very useful equivalent in a judicial aspect for
our 'immediate' evidence" ;56 and for adopting "oral" is that as
documents, properly considered, are a mere phase of real evidence,
there remains nothing of the reported class excepting oral evidence.
These substitutions, however, merely land him in further difficulties
for (i) by adding a third and different meaning to the already
ambiguous term "real evidence" he increases the very confusion he
condemns in Bentham and Best; and (2) by limiting reported evi-
dence to the testimony of witnesses and classing documents as "real,"
he introduces a qualification not only of very doubtful validity in itself,
but one which, if valid, would practically wreck his own division.
"My contention is this, that inspection by the tribunal of the con-
tents of a writing is just as much real evidence of those contents as
the inspection or perception of the features or peculiarities of any
other material object which may be produced in court, such, for
instance, as a knife . . . there is this difference, and this only,
between real and 'written' evidence-that in the case of writing, an
ulterior meaning is attached by convention to the characters; i. e..
to the shape and order of the marks. . . But this conclusion as
to the ulterior meaning of words . . . is simply . . . inference
from . . . our previous knowledge of the conventional mean-
ing. . . . Such an inference, if it alters the case at all, merely
converts our direct real evidence into indirect or circumstantial real
evidence. . . . And in any case, whether we choose to regard the
evidence as direct or as indirect, it is still, to the person who peruses
the document, 'immediate' evidence, and where the reader is repre-
sented -by a judicial tribunal, Real. . . The presence or absence
of this inference (from the written symbol to the conventional mean-
ing) may affect the nature of the evidence as direct or circumstantial,
but can have no bearing on its character as Real."
5 7
But Gulson is not correct in stating that the conventional meaning
attached to words constitutes the only difference between real and
written evidence. He omits a second and no less important factor,
viz., the tesfimonial, which is involved whenever the document is
used as proof of the matters asserted. These two features seem amply
'Ibid., sec. 318. "Ibid., sec. 229.
"Ibid., secs. 314, 315, 320.
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sufficient to discriminate written evidence from real. But even assum-
ing they are not, still all the arguments he uses to show that docu-
ments should be classed as real evidence, would equally apply to show
that oral evidence should be similarly classed, since he admits that
it, too, is "invariably brought home in toto to the mind of the
tribunal," which not only hears the words, but sees who is the speaker
and what his demeanor.5 8 But if this is so, then not only documents,
but oral testimony also, would have to be scrapped as separate classes,
and all evidence reduced to the single category of real. The truth
seems to be, however, that while material objects when produced fur-
nish immediate evidence alone, witnesses and documents furnish both
kinds, immediate in respect of their production to (or as Gulson
would have it their inspection by) the court, and reported in respect
of any facts they may narrate. As Chamberlayne remarks.
"Although any utterance, oral or documentary, is directly perceived
by the Court, and so may be called real evidence, yet the mental state,
intent, credibility, &c. which is the important or probative thing, is
not perceived and so is not real, but personal or transmitted evidence." 59
In view, then, of all this ambiguity, misinterpretation, and con-
fusion, is the phrase "Real Evidence" worth preserving? It is never
used in practice. Forensically, material objects are either referred
to by name, or under the general head of circumstantial evidence.
But in text-books, which have to deal with classification, its adoption
may, perhaps, in default of a better term, be defended. If so, which
of its meanings should be retained? It seems advisable to rule out
both Bentham's and Best's "any object belonging to the class of
things," and Gulson's mere "perception by the tribunal," and to
adhere to the more usual definition "Material objects, other than
documents, produced for .the inspection of the court."
With regard to Bentham's general division "Immediate and
Reported," Gulson's alternative of "Real and Oral" is, as we have
seen, unsatisfactory. But if any change is desired, it might perhaps
take the form of substituting for the term "Immediate," which
Bentham applies sometimes to the court and sometimes to the witness,
that of "Produced," which is in common use and unambiguous, and
would emphasize the point that evidence is furnished by the parties
and not by the tribunal.
b Chamberlayne, op. cit., secs. 23, 24."Ilbid., secs. 323, 345.
